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Inefficient competition in emissions taxes creates b nefits from international 
cooperation. In the presence of cross-border polluti n, proximate (neighboring) 
countries may have greater incentives to cooperate th n distant ones as illustrated by a 
model of tax competition for mobile capital. Spatial econometrics is used to estimate 
participation in 37 international environmental treati s. Data on 41 countries from 
1980-1999 reveal evidence of increased cooperation mong proximate countries. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that FDI usually increases treaty participation. We 
also find that both OECD and non-OECD countries respond positively to OECD 
countries’ participation but the response to non-OECD countries is primarily from 
similar countries. This suggests that the rich countries may lead others in setting 
environmental quality. 
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I.  Introduction 
Among the many controversies surrounding globalization, one of the fiercest is the 
effect of increased international commerce on enviro mental quality. Among the issues 
engaging the public and academic debate is the implications of competition in environmental 
policy for foreign direct investment (FDI). As discussed by Copeland and Taylor (2003, 
2004), if firms seek to avoid emissions taxes (the "pollution haven hypothesis"), then this can 
lead to governments lowering such taxes in order to attract firms (the race to the bottom). 
Thus, as firms become mobile, competition between hosts can then lead to sub-optimal 
emissions taxes. This inefficiency then provides a role for international environmental 
treaties that can coordinate standards across countries and lower world-wide pollution levels. 
While several papers have considered the impact of environmental policy on FDI or of FDI 
on the environment, these do not actually estimate wh ther there is indeed strategic 
interaction in environmental policies, i.e. whether there is evidence of international 
competition for FDI in environmental standards. 
This paper fills this gap in two key ways, one theoretical and one empirical. First, we 
develop a model of emissions tax competition with cross-border pollution spillovers. This 
simple model yields two key predictions. First, when emissions cross borders more easily, 
Nash equilibrium taxes are lower. This is because if a country is going to suffer pollution 
damages even if the firm locates elsewhere, it is better to host the firm and collect the 
benefits that hosting provides as this offsets at le st some of the pollution damages. Second, 
when cross-border spillovers increase, the gain from c operation (i.e. raising emissions taxes 
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and lowering pollution) increases. This yields a testable prediction: that a country’s own 
treaty participation depends on that of others and that it is more responsive to the 
participation of nearby countries.  
The second contribution of the paper is our modeling of the spatial autoregressive 
relationships in treaty participation.2 Using information on 37 treaties and 41 countries over a 
twenty year period, we find that the more treaties other countries ratify, the greater the 
propensity of a given country to ratify treaties. Furthermore, this effect is declining in 
distance between countries just as the theory predicts when cross-border spillovers are 
declining in distance. We interpret this as direct evidence of international strategic 
interactions in environmental policy. In particular, given the sign of our coefficient, we find 
that policies are strategic complements, a key requi ment for finding an inefficient “race to 
the bottom” in environmental standards. As such, this provides evidence for the contention 
that international economic agreements should be coupled with clauses related to 
environmental policy. In addition, we find, at least in the OECD countries, that inbound 
foreign direct investment (FDI) is a significant determinant of treaty participation. Finally, 
we find that the strategic responses are primarily d ven by the treaty participation of the 
OECD countries. That is, both OECD and non-OECD countries tend to increase their treaty 
participation when their OECD neighbors increase participation. For the non-OECD 
responses this suggests a “leader-follower” relationship, indicating that the wealthy countries 
                                                
2 This adds to the single treaty studies of Beron, et. al. (2003) and Murdoch, et. al. (2003). It also adds to the 
cross-US state spatial studies of Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Levinson (2003), and Frediksson, et. al. 
(2004). Below, we discuss all of these in detail. 
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may need to take a lead role in international environmental agreements if there is to be a 
hope of the developing countries following suit.  
The theoretical tax competition literature has demonstrated that the nature of the Nash 
equilibrium from tax competition for FDI is highly sensitive to the functional forms and 
parameters of the model. Depending on these choices, as discussed by Wilson’s (1986) 
seminal model, equilibrium taxes between jurisdictions can be strategic substitutes or 
strategic complements. As a result, Nash equilibrium taxes can be too high or too low 
relative to their optimal level.3 In part, this ambiguity arises due to changes in the elasticity of 
capital with respect to taxes since a rise in one country’s tax can increase or decrease the 
sensitivity of investment to the other country’s tax. As demonstrated by Rauscher (1995), 
Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler (1995), and Hoel (1997), adding pollution externalities adds 
additional ambiguities. In addition to tax sensitivity, ambiguities arise in the desirability of 
investment (since benefits to hosting must be compared to the environmental costs of 
hosting). Furthermore, Barrett (1994) finds that whether a race to the top or to the bottom in 
environmental taxes occurs can be determined by the market structure. Since these issues 
make it impossible to derive general results on the nature of tax competition equilibria even 
without cross-border spillovers, any results derived from a general model would be 
contingent on numerous additional assumptions. Thisis indeed what is shown by Fredriksson 
                                                
3 Note that even the definition of the optimal level is subject to debate since the optimal tax depends o  where 
the mobile firms’ profits accrue. If a social planner is maximizing a function of the host countries’ welfares, 
then she will not necessarily include the profits from FDI as a benefit from investment. This would then tend to 
lead to a tax rate greater than that which would be set if FDI profits accrue to the citizens of one of the host 
countries. This is why we use the term “optimal” rather than Pareto efficient since our model does not include 
FDI profits in the social planner’s objective function.  
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and Millimet (2002) who also consider strategic interaction in pollution abatement costs with 
cross-border pollution.4 
Because of this, we begin by making several simplifying assumptions in order to 
obtain results that match the concerns expressed in the popular debate: international 
competition for multinational enterprises (MNEs) leading to a race to the bottom in 
environmental standards. As is standard in the literature, we consider a MNE that allocates 
output to two jurisdictions taking into account therelative costs in each (including the cost of 
emissions taxes). Governments then use these taxes to balance out the benefits of hosting 
(which includes tax revenues collected from local emissions) versus the costs of hosting 
(pollution damages). A key facet of our model is that emissions not only cause pollution 
damages at their point of origin, but also overseas in the other country. The extent of these 
overseas damages depends on a parameter called the transf r coefficient. When the transfer 
coefficient is high (as it might be when countries are close to one another) these cross-border 
damages are higher.  
In the Nash equilibrium of the tax setting game, governments set taxes too low for 
three reasons. First, as is well-known in the tax competition literature, since a government 
does not internalize the lost benefits to the other country, it will set sub-optimal taxes in order 
to attract FDI. Second, with cross-border pollution, a host government does not internalize 
the international pollution damages caused by FDI within its borders. Therefore it will overly 
encourage firms to invest by implementing low taxes. Third, if a country does not host a 
                                                
4 Their model differs in two key ways. First, they assume that the pollution is ‘perfectly’ cross-border implying 
the same pollution level is faced by the two countries. Second, their model does not involve any competition for 
capital. Instead, in their model equilibrium pollution abatement is too low because neither country can trust the 
neighbor to choose the higher, globally more efficient, level of pollution abatement. 
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given unit of capital, it will still suffer pollution damages due to cross-border pollution. 
Combining these implies that Nash equilibrium tax rtes will be too low compared to those 
that maximize the sum of the two countries’ welfares. Furthermore, this third effect means 
that as the transfer coefficient rises (i.e. countries become closer to one another), Nash 
equilibrium taxes fall even more. At the same time, a rise in the transfer coefficient increases 
global damages from pollution. As such, when the distance between countries falls, the gain 
from joining an international environmental treaty that raises emissions taxes increases.  
Spatial econometrics provide an excellent method of testing such interactions because 
they allow the econometrician to use the dependent variable from one observation (treaty 
participation by country i) as an explanatory variable in another observation (treaty 
participation by country j) in a way that deals with endogeneity this interdependence causes.5 
This method contrasts sharply with the bulk of the literature on globalization and the 
environment which either considers the effect of FDI on pollution or the effect of emissions 
taxes on FDI.6 Since neither of these approaches use the policy variable as the dependent 
variable, they do not test for strategic interactions, i.e. whether the environmental policy of 
                                                
5 Note that if one country ratifies a treaty before another, it is possible to treat that decision as exog nous to 
those that occur later in time (as is used in calcul ting a Stackelberg equilibrium instead of a Nash equilibrium). 
However, since ratification typically follows an ext nded period of consideration by a signatory country, there 
is still the possibility of interaction during this phase. Furthermore, since our explanatory variables ar  limited 
to annual observations, we cannot exploit the finer time series information that the exact date of rati ic ion 
provides us. Therefore, since there is still the possibility of endogeneity in our annual data on ratifications, we 
turn to spatial econometrics. For a detailed discusion of spatial econometrics, see Anselin (1988). 
6 Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) find little evidence of a relationship of FDI on SO2 concentrations. 
Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) provide a literature review of the studies considering the effect of host 
country environmental regulations on FDI. More recent studies include Jeppesen et al. (2002), Fredriksson et al. 
(2003), List et al. (2003), Javorcik and Wei (2004), and Henderson and Millimet (2006). The evidence of the 
effect of environmental stringency on investment decisions has been mixed. To contrast the FDI literature, 
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor  (2001), Dean (2002), Harbaugh et al. (2002), Frankel and Rose (2005), and 
Naughton (2006) find that openness to trade improves th  environment. 
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one country is affected by the environmental policy of another. Of those papers that do 
consider strategic interactions in environmental policy, they are limited either in their time 
series or country information.7 
Using spatial probit techniques Beron, Murdoch, andVijverberg (2003) and 
Murdoch, Sandler, and Vijverberg (2003) estimate strategic interactions in ratification of the 
Montreal and the Helsinki Protocols, respectively. Using either a trade-based or emissions-
based weighting scheme, Beron, Murdoch, and Vijverberg find no significant strategic 
interactions in ratification of the Montreal Protocol in their sample of 89 countries. Murdoch, 
Sandler, and Vijverberg use a cross-section of 25 European countries to estimate the strategic 
interactions in Helsinki Protocol ratification using emissions-based weights. They model 
treaty participation in a two-stage setting, where in the first stage countries decide whether or 
not to ratify the Protocol and in the second stage they choose their level of sulfur emissions 
reduction. The authors find positive and statistically significant interaction effects in 
Montreal Protocol ratification. Our study improves upon these studies in two ways. First, 
rather than using cross-sectional data, we employ panel data on 41 countries for 1980-1999. 
In particular, allowing us to control for contemporaneous effects of neighboring countries. 
Second, we employ a comprehensive measure of international cooperation that involves 37 
treaties instead of using a single treaty as others ave. This adds to these results by yielding 
information on the general propensity of a country to participate in treaties rather than 
whether it joins a particular treaty.  
                                                
7 For a review of empirical tax competition studies s e Brueckner (2003). 
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Of the studies that do use panel data, they all use information for a single country and 
employ US state level data to estimate strategic interactions in environmental stringency.  
Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Levinson (2003) and Fredriksson, List, and Millimet 
(2004) all find that states compete in environmental stringency, as measured by the Levinson 
Index. Levinson (2003) also finds competition across states in the hazardous waste disposal 
tax rates. Additionally, Fredriksson, List, and Millimet (2004) allow for strategic interactions 
across different policy variables. They find that considering strategic interactions in a single 
policy setting provides lower bound estimates. Although we use a comparable empirical 
approach, we work with international data. One of the primary difficulties in extending these 
state-level studies to international competition is that emissions taxes and other policies are 
very difficult to compare across countries due to the wide range of regulatory policies 
surrounding them. This is one of the primary advantages to using international environmental 
treaties as our variable of interest since by definitio , these are comparable across countries.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the 
theoretical model. In section 3 we overview the empirical approach and discuss the data. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
II.  Theoretical Model 
As discussed above, any general theory of tax competition for FDI will be plagued by 
ambiguities that can only be resolved by making restrictive assumptions.8 Since our goal in 
this section is to construct a model that motivates our empirical work, rather than impose 
                                                
8 Wilson (1999) and Gresik (2001) provide recent overviews of tax competition for FDI. Their literature 
reviews highlight the various ambiguities found in the literature both with and without pollution. 
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such restrictions ex-post we impose them at the beginning by choosing specific functional 
forms. This is the easiest method of illustrating our underlying story: that proximity can 
worsen the inefficiencies resulting from tax competition and increase the gain from 
cooperation. 
Consider a multinational firm that invests in two countries, home and foreign. Foreign 
variables are denoted with *s. The timing of choices is that governments simultaneously 
choose emissions tax rates and then the MNE maximizes profits through its capital 
allocation. Using subgame perfection, we begin by describing the firm and work our way 
backwards. Production in each country uses capital ( K ) in a constant returns to scale 
technology. We normalize the production function so that output in home is K  and output in 





P A K K= − + . (1) 
The firm faces three types of costs. First, it faces a cost of raising capital ( )2*
2
K K
γ + . 
Second, it faces transportation costs between each country and the world market. 








.9 Third it 
faces a tax on the emissions it creates in a given cou try. Emissions are a linear function of 
                                                
9 Alternatively, these transportation costs could be increasing costs of hiring local factors such as labor. If the 
wage is an increasing convex function of labor hired, as would occur if other sectors use labor, then it is 
possible to derive labor cost functions as they depend on K and K* that are comparable to these transport cost 
functions. This approach could also provide a link between these and the benefits of hosting. However, in the 
interest of simplicity, we use this alternative, trade cost approach.  
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output, where units are again normalized so that home (foreign) emissions are K  ( *K ). The 
per-unit home emission tax is t  and the per-unit foreign emission tax is *t . Combining these 
yields the firm’s profit function: 
 ( ) ( )2* * 2 *2 * * *( )
2 2 2 2
B
A K K K K K K tK t K K K
α δ γπ  = − + + − − − − − + 
 
. (2) 
Taking tax rates as given, the first order conditions from this with respect to K  and *K  yield 
respectively: 
 ( ) ( )* * 0A B K K K tK K Kα γ− + − − − + =  and (3) 
 ( ) ( )* * * * * 0A B K K K t K K Kδ γ− + − − − + = . (4) 





























γ α+ += − <
∆
 (8) 
where ( )( ) 0Bα δ γ∆ ≡ + + > . Thus, an increase in one country’s tax drives FDI from that 
country to the other. It is also worth noting that total investment ( *K K+ ) is decreasing in 
either tax rate. These results on the impact of taxes on capital (either in a given country or 
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worldwide) are standard in the literature and are robust to generalizations of our functional 
forms. 
These tax rates are chosen simultaneously by the two governments in order to 
maximize their own national welfares. Home welfare consists of three items. The first is a 
benefit of hosting FDI given by K λ  where (0,1)λ ∈ . This represents gains to local 
employment, technological spillovers, and the like. The second item is the cost of local 
emissions. This is linear in the level of local emissions and is (partially) offset by the taxes 
collected on those emissions. Therefore the net environmental damage from hosting is 
(1 )t K− . Finally, it suffers damages from overseas emissions through cross-border pollution. 
The level of these damages is *aK  where 0a >  is the transfer coefficient and represents the 
impact of emissions across borders. How equilibrium tax rates change in a is the primary 
focus of this section.10 
With these ideas in place, home welfare then is given by: 
 *( 1)Y K t K aKλ= + − − . (9) 
Foreign welfare is analogously: 
 * * * *( 1)Y K t K aKλ= + − − . (10) 
Taking the first-order condition of (9) results in a implicit best response function *( )t t  for 
home. Specifically, this is determined by: 
                                                
10 For simplicity, we assume that both λ  and a  are the same across countries. While the first is not necessary 
for our results, the second is important because it ensures that the global environmental damages are a function 
of the total amount of investment, not the distribution of investment. Having linear damages with equal 
marginal impact across countries is important to ensure that the social planner does not have an incentive to 
shift investment from one country to another as a  changes. If we relax this, it complicates the problem and 
again introduces ambiguities that, although interesting, detract from the purpose of our theory. 
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 ( )1 *( ) 1 0dY B BK t t a K
dt
λγ δ γλ −+ + += − + − − + =
∆ ∆
 (11) 
where K is determined by the two tax rates. From this, we can determine the following 
results. First, 
 ( ) ( )
*




λγ δ λ λ
γ δ
− ∆= + + − + >
+ +
 (12) 
i.e. a rise in FDI increases home’s tax best-respone tax rate since pollution damages rise and 
the benefits of hosting decline. Second, holding K  constant, 
 
*( ) ( )
0
( )














( ) 1 ( 1)( )
0
( ) ( 1) 2
B K Bdt t
dt B K B
λ
λ
γ λ λ γ δ
γ δ λ λ γ δ
− −
− −
+ − − + + ∆
= − >
+ + − + + ∆ −
. (14) 
This shows that home’s best-response tax is increasing in the foreign tax, i.e. taxes are 
strategic complements for home. As indicated in the above cited work, such a finding is 
dependent on the functional forms used. However, since the common belief is that taxes are 
bid down as governments compete for investment, this result matches that covered by the 







( ) ( 1) 2
dt t B
da B K Bλ
γ
γ δ λ λ γ δ− −
+= <
+ + − + + ∆ −
, (15) 
indicating that as the transfer coefficient rises, home’s best-response tax falls. Graphically, 
this would be a shift in home’s best response from the solid line to the dashed line in Figure 1 
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when a  rises from 1a  to 2a . The intuition for this change is straightforward. As the transfer 
coefficient rises, the damages home suffers from foreign’s investment rises. As such, home 
has a greater incentive to “steal” that investment si ce this allows it to enjoy the benefits of 
hosting and collect additional emissions taxes, offsetting a portion of the environmental 
damages. 




* 1 * *
*
( ) 1 0
dY B B
K t t a K
dt
λγ α γλ −+ + += − + − − + =
∆ ∆
 (16) 
From this, it is straightforward to show that foreign’s optimal tax is increasing in home’s tax 
and falling in the transfer coefficient for reasons analogous to those for home.  
The Nash equilibrium in the tax-setting game is found by simultaneously solving (11) 
and (16) accounting for how FDI levels vary in the ax rates. What is important for our 
purposes, however, is how this equilibrium changes in the transfer coefficient. Since a rise in 
a  reduces both *( )t t  for a given *t  and * ( )t t  for a given t , Nash equilibrium tax rates fall 
when a  rises. Graphically, this moves the Nash equilibrium from A to B in Figure 1. Note 
that as tax rates fall, total investment (and total environmental damages) rise. 
At the same time, however, a rise in the transfer co fficient raises the optimal taxes 
for a social planner maximizing the sum of the nation’s welfares. Consider such a planner 
who maximizes *W Y Y≡ + . The first order conditions from the social planner’s problem 
yield optimal taxes implicitly determined by: 
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 ( ) ( )1 * 1 *1 1 0dW B BK t a K t a K
dt




 ( ) ( )* 1 * 1 ** 1 1 0dW B BK t a K t a Kdt
λ λγ α γλ λ− −+ + += − + − − + + − − + =
∆ ∆
. (18) 
Evaluating (17) at the Nash equilibrium yields: 
 ( )* 1 * 1 0dW B Ba K t
dt
λγ δ γ λ −+ + += + + − >
∆ ∆
 (19) 
as long as foreign welfare is increasing in *K (i.e. hosting is desirable). A similar condition 
can be found for the foreign tax. As a result, Nash equilibrium taxes are lower than those the 
social planner would choose, yielding the oft-discussed “race to the bottom” in 
environmental taxes. This is because when choosing that tax in one location, the social 
planner internalizes the lost benefits of hosting to the other country, the additional tax 
revenue from emissions in the other country, and the effect of cross-border pollution. Note 
that this result does not hold in general as discussed by Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler 
(1995) since under different assumptions (particularly very large damages from pollution) a 
race to the top is also possible.11 
It is now necessary to ask how these optimal taxes change as the transfer coefficient 
changes. For notational convenience, we define the following three variables: 
2 22
2 * 2( 1) 2 0
d W B B B
K K
dt
λ λγ δ γ γ δλ λ − −
  + + + + +   Φ = = − + − <       ∆ ∆ ∆     
, 
                                                
11 Furthermore, McAusland (2002) and Eerola (2004) find that, due to the exclusion of multinational firm 
profits from the countries’ objective functions that t xes are inefficiently high compared to the global welfare 
maximum. Similarly, since our combined welfare measure does not include multinational profits optimal taxes 






( 1) 2 0
d W B B B
K K
dt
λ λγ γ α γ δλ λ − −





( 1) 2 0
d W B B B B
K K
dtdt
λ λγ γ δ γ α γλ λ − −
 +  + + + +  +   Ω = = − − + − >     ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆     
. 
Note that by the social planner’s second order conditi , 2 0Ψ ≡ ΦΓ − Ω > . We can now 














α δΦ − Ω= − >
∆Ψ
. (21) 
As in the individual country’s cases, the intuition is straightforward. As the transfer 
coefficient rises, environmental damages rise from a given amount of capital.12 This reduces 
the social planner’s desired level of total capital, leading her to increase both tax rates and 
reduce overall investment. This would then move optimal taxes from C to D in Figure 1. This 
result is comparable to that of Cremer and Gahvari (2004), who study competition in 
commodity taxes and emissions taxes with cross-border pollution. They too find that 
                                                
12 An alternative modeling choice would be to have the transfer coefficient represent the percent of emissions 
that “land” in the overseas country, leaving only (1-a)K emissions in home. This yields similar results rega ding 
Nash equilibrium taxes compared to the social planner’s taxes since as a rises, a country’s incentive to attract 
FDI rises since its pollution costs fall. Under this assumption, however, worldwide pollution damages ar  
invariant to the transfer coefficient, implying tha the social planner’s desired taxes do not change when a 
changes. Nevertheless, here too the gains from cooperation rise as the distance between countries falls.
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harmonization of emissions taxes above the Nash equilibrium level across countries reduces 
aggregate emissions and increases overall welfare.  
An important implication of this result is that as the transfer coefficient rises, the gap 
between the Nash equilibrium taxes and the optimal taxes rises. As a result, the combined 
gains from cooperating and increasing tax rates increases as the transfer coefficient increases 
This then gives us a testable prediction – that countries for which the transfer coefficient is 
large will tend to find cooperation more beneficial than countries for whom it is small. If the 
damages from cross-border pollution are falling in distance, i.e. a  is inversely related to the 
distance between countries, then proximate countries w ll have a greater incentive to 
cooperate than distant ones. If participation in inter ational environmental agreements is a 
sign of such cooperation, the theory predicts that ne rby countries may be more likely to 
jointly sign on to environmental agreements than distant countries. In the next section, we 
turn discuss the empirical methods used to find evience of exactly such patterns in 
environmental treaty participation. 
III.  Empirical Approach and Data 
If competition for FDI leads to inefficiently low taxes and conversely higher gains 
from cooperation this should be evidenced in the data on environmental treaty participation. 
Furthermore, if due to cross-border spillovers these gains are greater for nearby countries, 
then a country’s own treaty participation should depend more on the participation of 
proximate countries rather than distant ones. In this section we use participation in 
international multilateral environmental treaties to measure cooperation in environmental 
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policy. The set of multilateral environmental treati s is large and growing.13 The Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network (CIES N) provides country-level 
participation data for 384 multilateral agreements. Of these agreements, we use the 37 
treaties that are neither explicitly restricted to certain countries nor are amendments to 
previous agreements.14 Appendix A classifies the included treaties into categories, provides 
the year of signature and the number of parties. The treaty categories include the sea, fish and 
air treaties.  First, there are twelve sea treaties which have to do with prevention of and 
response to marine pollution. Second, the ten fishing treaties are those that deal with 
conservation and harvest of fish and whales.15 Third, three air treaties deal with air pollution. 
Note that although it may not necessarily be the cas  that a given treaty directly affects a 
multinational firm, to the extent that treaty participation is correlated with policies that do 
have a direct impact, our estimates are still informative regarding the nature of competition 
for FDI. Using these, the dependent variable in our empirical model is treaty participation 
measured as the count of treaties a country has ratified as of a given year.16,17 
Our empirical specification follows closely Fredriksson and Millimet (2002): 
                                                
13 For an overview of international environmental trea i s see Mitchell (2003). 
14 Two treaties in our sample have a restriction on participation to only include countries that are memb rs of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (this includes 190 countries).  Eight more treaties 
require the potential parties to be member countries of the United Nations. These restrictions did not bind for 
any of our sample countries. 
15 We also considered a more general sub-group of treaties that dealt with conservation of animals and plants. 
The issues dealt with by this broader category are less focused than those of fishing treaties which often specify 
very specific goals for members. This is why we present results for this more focused category of treaties. 
Nevertheless, the results for this classification were similar to the fish treaties’ results. 
16 Note that countries that initially sign treaties must also ratify the treaty to become a party. 
17 In similar vein, Roberts, Parks, and Vasquez (2004) estimate a model determining treaty participation in 22 
multilateral environmental treaties using a comparable count variable. They use cross-sectional data and do not 
allow for strategic interactions. 
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 ,it t ij jt it it it
j i
E E FDI xγ δ ω φ β ε
≠
= + + + +∑  (22) 
where Eit is treaty participation by country i in year t; tγ  are year fixed effects; ijω  is the time 
invariant weight assigned to country j by country i; Ejt is treaty participation by country j in 
year t; δ  is the spatial lag coefficient that measures strategic interaction in treaty 
participation; FDIit is FDI flow into country i in year t; itx  is a vector of country i 
characteristics in year t; and itε  represents i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks uncorrelated cross 
countries or years.18  




∑ , is the weighted average of other countries’ treaty 
participation in year t. The coefficient on spatial lag provides information about the strategic 
interactions in treaty participation and our theoretical model predicts it to be positive (i.e. 
environmental policies are strategic complements). That is if a country’s neighbors increase 
treaty participation in a given year, then the country tends to increase its participation as 
well.19 It is important to note that the spatial lag introduces an endogeneity problem inherent 
to spatial autoregression: Eit depends on Ejt and Ejt on Eit.
20 This gives us the first endogenous 
variable that we will need to control for.  
                                                
18 Including quadratic trend terms in place of year fixed effects does not qualitatively change the results. 
19 A negative spatial lag suggests that an increase in proximate countries’ treaty participation would reduce 
treaty participation. This type of dynamic could arise if the emissions tax response functions are strategic 
substitutes (i.e. best responses have a negative slop ). As discussed above, generalized versions of emissions tax 
competition show that this is indeed a theoretical possibility although one contradicted by most of our estimates. 
20 Again, because we are not able to exploit the information on the exact timing of ratifications, we must allow 
for possible endogeneity. 
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While the theory suggests that the weights used in the construction of the spatial lag 
should be declining in distance (increasing in cross-border pollution), it does not suggest a 
specific form. Similar to Levinson (2003), the result  presented in this paper use the 




j iij ijd d
ω
≠
= ∑ , (23) 
where dij is the distance between country i and country j. The sum in the denominator ensures 
that our spatial lag is a weighted average not a weight d sum of other countries’ treaty 
participation.21 This so-called “row standardization,” where the sum of weights for each 
country equals one, is standard in spatial autoregression analysis. Using this row 
standardization allows us to interpret the spatial lag’s coefficient as the marginal effect of 
other countries’ participation, not the “remoteness” of country i. Alternative spatial weight 
specifications provide qualitatively similar result.22 
In addition to the spatial lag, FDI is a second endogenous variable. Previous studies 
that estimate environmental policy variables have not i cluded FDI in the set of independent 
variables. Nevertheless, Ederington and Minier (2003), Fredriksson, List, and Millimet 
(2003), and List et al. (2003) argue that not only does FDI respond to environmental 
regulation but also that environmental regulation ca be impacted by FDI. Also, our 
theoretical model includes FDI in the government’s problem of choosing emissions taxes, 
                                                





ω = , does not qualitatively 
change the full sample results. 
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and emissions taxes influence the capital owner’s allocation of FDI across countries. 
Therefore, we include FDI as a determinant of treaty p rticipation and instrument for it as 
described below to allow for the endogeneity. Consistent with the theoretic results in 
equation (12), we anticipate a positive coefficient for our instrument for FDI. 
Estimating equation (22) using OLS would provide biased estimates because of the 
endogeneity problems. We use instrumental variable (IV) estimation instead of spatial 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation for two reasons. First, IV estimation provides 
consistent estimates even in the presence of spatially correlated errors. Second, this approach 
is easier to implement when dealing with the endogeneity of FDI. Brueckner (2003) 
describes both IV and ML methodologies used in estimation of strategic interactions. 
To instrument for the spatial lag and FDI, two first-stage equations must be estimated: 
 ij jt t ij jt ij jt it it it
j i j i j i
E a b x c z z d x f eω ω ω
≠ ≠ ≠
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (24) 
and 
 it t it ij jt ij jt it it
j i j i
FDI z x z x uρ κ χ ω ψ ω θ
≠ ≠
= + + + + +∑ ∑ . (25) 
The instruments for the spatial lag are the weighted averages of all exogenous variables using 
the same weights as those used to calculate the spatial lag itself. Details on the sources and 
descriptions of all variables are found in Appendix B. Summary statistics and a list of 
countries in the sample are reported in Table 1. FDI is instrumented for by a set of variables 
zit: trade costs, education, and investment costs.
23 In the second stage, the fitted values of 
                                                
23 Note that since we are estimating a country’s total inbound FDI flows, we do not control for parent country 
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∑  and 
itFDI . 
In addition to the endogenous spatial lag and FDI variables, the model includes 
eleven exogenous variables.24 GDP, population and area control for the economic, 
demographic and geographic sizes of the countries. Following other studies, we expect to 
find that large economies are likely to participate in more international agreements. On the 
other hand, holding GDP constant, increasing population decreases GDP per capita. If 
environmental quality (provided by increased standards nd treaty participation) is a normal 
good then the income effect captured by population w uld lead to a negative coefficient. The 
geographic area is included for two reasons. First, it allows us to control for the population 
density and second it is a proxy for the abundance of natural resources in the country. 
Holding population constant, as area increases population density decreases lowering 
environmental pressures and increases regulation. On the other hand, countries with more 
natural resources may want to have an unrestricted ability to exploit these resources and 
therefore have more lax environmental policies. Given these conflicting predictions, we have 
no a priori expectation regarding this sign and merely acknowledge that our results will 
estimate the net effect of geographic size.  
                                                                                                                                            
variables as bilateral FDI flow regressions do (e.g. Eaton and Tamura, 1994 or Blonigen and Davies, 2004). 
24 A great advantage of our approach is that we are able to include these additional variables whereas a simple 
cross-section such as the spatial probit analysis of Beron et al. (2003) and Murdoch et al. (2003) are unable to 
since the inclusion of so many explanatory variables dramatically reduces their degrees of freedom. If we 
instead use a cross-sectional probit approach as they do, we are similarly forced to cut some of our explanatory 
variables in order to obtain results making it impossible to directly compare these results with those reported.  
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Urbanization and unemployment are included to characte ize the countries’ economic 
climate. Urbanized countries are likely to be more industrialized and opt for lower regulation 
to encourage higher output. This suggests a negative coefficient. Similarly, one might expect 
that countries with higher unemployment are more int rested in attracting investment, 
leading them to set lower standards and reduce their treaty participation. 
A country’s political climate is captured through political freedom, corruption and the 
European Union (EU) dummy variables. Political freedom comes with improved information 
about environmental issues and ability of citizens to impact government policy. Hence, 
presuming that citizens prefer strong environmental standards, political freedom should 
increase treaty participation. Corrupt countries are likely viewed as not credible in the 
international arena and may not be courted for treaty p rticipation by other countries. 
Furthermore, corrupt countries may be more isolated nd less likely to engage themselves in 
any international agreements. EU countries are undergoing a major wave of harmonization in 
all types of policies. It is likely that this is also true with respect to environmental policies. In 
addition, these relatively wealthy countries are well-known for their pro-environmental 
stances. Therefore, we expect them, all else equal, to participate in more treaties. 
To distinguish between coastal and landlocked countries, we include a landlocked 
country dummy variable. Inclusion of this variable is particularly important when analyzing 
different types of treaties because landlocked countries receive more cross-border pollution 
while coastal countries are likely relatively more concerned with sea pollution and fish.  
Finally, two trade related variables are included: xport diversification and market 
potential. A country with a diverse export base may choose to engage in more environmental 
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regulation because it may be able to switch between industries easier.25 Higher market 
potential, defined as the distance-weighted sum of other countries’ GDPs, acts as a proxy for 
the importance of other countries as trading partners and is inversely related to the trade cost 
between a country and the world market described in theory. Thus, given the prediction of 
equation (13), we anticipate a negative coefficient on he market potential.  
IV.  Results 
We first present the results for treaty participation in all 37 treaties by the full sample 
of countries to determine the potential biases caused by omitting the spatial lag and by not 
instrumenting for FDI. Then to allow for different underlying processes in participation 
decisions by treaty type we group treaties into those related to the sea and ocean pollution, 
fish treaties, and air pollution treaties. Following this, because environmental policy 
decisions by rich and poor countries may not be driven by the same motives we separately 
estimate models for the OECD and non-OECD sub samples. In addition, we examine 
whether a given country’s treaty participation responds differently to countries in the same 
income category as those outside of it. Finally, we utilize several alternative specifications to 
check the robustness of our results. 
IV.1 Baseline Results 
Table 2 begins with an initial specification without a spatial lag or an accounting for 
the endogeneity of FDI. In column (2) we instrument for FDI. Column (3) again treats FDI as 
exogenous but adds a spatial lag. Finally, in column (4) both instrument for FDI and use a 
                                                
25 Roberts, Parks, and Vasquez (2004) also include this variable in their model of treaty participation. 
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spatial lag. This sequence of specification allows us to examine the sensitivity of our 
estimates to both the assumption of exogenous FDI and the need for a spatial lag.  
When we instrument for FDI, the sign on the FDI variable switches from positive and 
statistically insignificant to negative and statistically significant. Therefore, we find a 
positive endogeneity bias on the FDI coefficient. Iclusion of the spatial lag changes the 
coefficient on the market potential from positive to negative and statistically significant. 
Therefore, omission of the spatial lag affects the market potential variable.26 Because both 
the spatial lag and the market potential have geographic features, it is not surprising that the 
two are related. In both cases, several coefficients also changed statistical significance 
relative to column (1), however since these are not our preferred specifications, we do not 
discuss these for brevity’s sake. 
When both corrections are implemented by the regression model in column (4) there 
are two key changes in the results from column (1) — both FDI and market potential change 
coefficients to negative and statistically significant. As predicted, the spatial lag is positive 
and statistically significant implying a complementary strategic interaction among proximate 
countries’ decision to join treaties. Given the results, we find that if all other countries 
(weighted by a negative function of distance) in the sample join one more treaty, that the 
country in question will join 0.76 more treaties, i.e. they increase their treaty participation by 
less than one.  This effect is a long-run effect driven by cross-sectional variation. The 
negative effect of FDI on treaty participation is evidence contrary to our theory. This result is 
                                                
26 A similar result is found in Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2005) who find that when estimaing 
FDI patterns, omission of either the spatial lag or the market potential can dramatically affect the estimated 
coefficient of the other variable.  
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at least in part driven by pooling data for poor and rich countries and we deal with this issue 
below. Consistent with the theory, the market potential is negative and significant indicating 
that countries closer to other markets are less likely to join treaties. 
IV.II Differences Among Types of Treaties 
Motivations that drive treaty participation are likely to vary by the types of 
environmental problems targeted by these agreements. For example, landlocked countries are 
likely relatively more concerned with air pollution than sea pollution. As a result, we refine 
our treaty participation variable by using subsets of the original 37 treaties—sea treaties, fish 
treaties, and air treaties.  
In addition to repeating the results from Table 2’s column (4) for all treaties, Table 3 
also presents the results for the three different tr aty participation variables as defined above. 
In each case, the spatial lag remains positive and significant as our theory predicts. While the 
coefficient on FDI remains negative for the sea and fish treaties, we now find the predicted 
significant positive coefficient for FDI in the air treaty participation equation. Finally, market 
potential is again negative and significant for the sea and fish treaties as predicted although it 
is weakly positive for air treaties. 
Beyond these, our other explanatory variables show a fairly consistent pattern. 
Specifically, GDP, Area, and the EU dummy are generally positive and significant. Likewise, 
population and urbanization are consistently negative and significant. Finally, as expected, 
Landlocked is negative and significant in the fish treaties regression of column (3) suggesting 
that coastal economies are more likely to participate in these agreements. Thus, there is some 
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evidence of variation in the factors influencing the number of treaties a country participates 
in depending on the type of environmental issues th treaty addresses. 
IV.III OECD vs. Non-OECD Countries 
Divergence in environmental policies across rich and poor countries has been a 
source of concern in the past. In line with this concern, environmental treaty participation is 
more prevalent by OECD countries since on average OECD countries participate in nineteen 
treaties while on average non-OECD countries only participate in ten. Thus, it is likely that 
underlying motivations for joining treaties for rich and poor countries may be different as 
well. To examine such differences Table 4 presents the regression results for OECD and non-
OECD countries separately. 
When we split the sample, we find several differences relative to the combined results 
in Table 3. First, while the spatial lag is positive and significant in the OECD results across 
the board, in non-OECD regressions it is insignificant. One likely reason for this is the large 
drop in the number of observations. A second reason, and one we explore in depth below, is 
that this spatial lag is only within the sample, i.. t measures the response of OECD 
countries to other OECD countries and non-OECD respon es to other non-OECD countries. 
If cross-group participation is important, then these spatial lags will not capture such effects. 
Furthermore, as seen below, the omission of these cross-group lags may be biasing these 
non-OECD coefficients towards zero. 
The second difference is that, unlike the combined results, FDI is almost always 
positive and significant as predicted by theory. As discussed by Blonigen and Davies (2004), 
FDI data is skewed towards the rich OECD countries. As such, even after logging this 
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variable, it can create misleading estimated coeffici nts when combining both rich and poor 
countries. Since, after splitting the rich and poor c untries into different samples our FDI 
variable conforms to our predictions, it seems thatsimilar issues arise in our data. The third 
key difference is that, although the market potential retains the same signs for the OECD 
countries as found in the combined sample, for the non-OECD countries it is positive and 
significant for all, sea and air treaties equations. This might be the case if the non-OECD 
countries use international treaty participation to appease wealthy potential trading partners. 
As such poor countries with larger market potential have more to gain by such overtures and 
therefore participate in more treaties. 
In addition to these differences, other noteworthy differences exist in our other 
explanatory variables. First, OECD countries with higher area tend to participate in fewer 
treaties while larger non-OECD countries tend to join more treaties. So, the environmental 
resources effect outweighs the population density effect associated with the geographic area 
in the non-OECD countries. Since these economies are likely more dependent on natural 
resources, this is consistent with our priors. Second, urbanization tends to reduce treaty 
participation in OECD countries and increase it in no -OECD countries. The correlation 
between urbanization and education (which neither we nor other studies include) is fairly 
high. Thus, the positive coefficient on urbanization n non-OECD sample could be capturing 
the effect of education on treaty participation. Another difference is in the coefficient on the 
freedom index. Higher civil liberties and personal rights tend to increase treaty participation 
among rich countries but reduce it among poor countries. This might be the case if citizens in 
poor countries (which are on the upward sloping part of the environmental Kuznets curve) 
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are more willing to sacrifice environmental quality for economic growth than their 
counterparts in rich countries (who are on the downward sloping portion).27 If an increase in 
political freedom is indicative of government policies that better reflect the people’s wishes, 
then just such a difference in coefficients would be expected. Fourth, while the EU countries 
tended to participate in more treaties than the average country in the full sample, when 
compared to OECD countries EU countries join fewer tr aties than the average.  Fifth, a 
diverse export base increases treaty participation in rich countries but reduces it in poor 
countries. Again, this might arise when an increase in export diversification reflects a fall the 
political influence of a given industry. In developing countries, exporters may prefer stronger 
environmental standards because of the “environmentally-friendly” verification this provides 
their exports to developed countries. Thus, a more div rsified export base weakens the push 
for such standards. In developed countries, firms already meet many such conditions due to 
other local regulations. As such, if firms could coordinate, they might aim for a general 
weakening of standards. Thus, export diversification may reflect the inability of exporters to 
coordinate and lobby for their desired level of environmental regulations, i.e. more treaties 
are joined.  
As noted above, the spatial lag in Table 4 is a weight d sum of treaty participation in 
the particular sample considered. This precludes th ability of poor countries to respond to 
the treaty participation of rich countries and vice versa. Table 5 reintroduces this interaction 
                                                
27 The environmental Kuznets curve relates income to pollution levels. Generally, an inverted U shape is found, 
i.e. as income rises pollution initially rises and then falls. See Graham (2000) for a discussion of the linkages 
between pollution, FDI, and the environmental Kuznets curve. 
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by including the spatial lag of non-OECD countries’ treaty participation to the OECD 
equation and the spatial lag of OECD countries’ participation to the non-OECD equation. 
For the OECD results in columns (1) through (4), the results are similar to those from 
Table 4, i.e. we find a significantly positive OECD to OECD spatial lag across the board. 
Conversely, we find a significant non-OECD to OECD spatial lag which has a surprising 
negative coefficient for the fish treaties. This suggests that on the whole OECD countries pay 
little attention to what the poorer countries do when deciding on environmental treaty 
participation. If the FDI that OECD firms are looking to attract does not even consider the 
non-OECD countries as potential hosts, this result would make sense. As discussed by Carr, 
Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003), FDI in the OECD 
countries is generally of the horizontal type implying that it values highly skilled workers and 
access to wealthy consumers. As such, this would indeed suggest that such MNEs do not 
consider the non-OECD countries as suitable hosts fr FDI.  
Turning to the non-OECD results in columns (5) through (8), unlike Table 4, we now 
find two significantly positive within non-OECD spati l lag. Furthermore, in each 
specification we find a positive OECD to non-OECD spatial lags (for all treaties and fishing 
treaties). Thus, we again find evidence of competition between non-OECD countries 
although the evidence is somewhat weaker. In addition, we find that the poorer non-OECD 
countries tend to respond highly to their richer OECD counterparts. This provides further 
evidence that rich and poor countries have alternative motives to join treaties and that the 
“trading partner appeasement” story above may be an important factor in poor country’s 
treaty-participation decisions. This possibility is reinforced by the fact that inclusion of the 
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OECD spatial lag eliminates the surprising positive market potential coefficient in two of the 
four non-OECD regressions.  
IV.IV Robustness Checks 
It is obviously important to ask to what extent ourresults are sensitive to the 
econometric specifications we have chosen. Therefore in this sub-section our goal is to give 
an overview of the various robustness checks we havundertaken (the results of which are 
available on request). First, our model uses the linear treaty participation variable but logs 
FDI, market potential, GDP, population and area. This is because these explanatory variables 
are highly skewed. As a robustness check for the functional form chosen we estimate log of 
treaty participation with the right-hand-side unchanged (a log-log model) and another 
specification of treaty participation without any logged variables (a lin-lin model). These 
regressions provide qualitatively similar results. 
We also estimate models with continental fixed effects to control for regional 
heterogeneity across regions. For the full sample the qualitative nature of the results does not 
greatly change as we continue to find significantly positive spatial lags, a similar pattern in 
the signs of the coefficient for FDI, and a significantly negative coefficient on market 
potential. The sub sample regressions continue to show imilarly signed coefficients to the 
reported results although the coefficients are not as significant. Specifications with country 
specific trends provide less significant but to large extent similar results both for the entire 
sample and for the OECD and non-OECD sub samples. Inclusion of the country fixed effects 
does not change the results for the full sample but yields less significant results for the sub-




The potential inefficiencies caused by competition f r mobile firms have become a 
contentious source of debate in policy, public, andcademic circles. In this paper, we present 
a theoretic model that suggests that such inefficiencies might be greatest among nearby 
countries due to the presence of cross-border pollution. Therefore, the gains from cooperating 
through international environmental agreements are greatest among such countries. Using 
information on environmental treaty participation in 41 countries over a twenty year period, 
we find evidence that strategic interaction in environmental policies does indeed exist. By 
using data on treaty participation, this allows us to avoid the difficulties in comparing 
environmental policies across countries. Furthermore, by using panel data, we can control for 
year-specific effects and a greater number of other control variables than other studies of 
international treaty participation have. 
The results from this estimation also yield several other interesting results. In 
particular, countries with more FDI tend to participate in more environmental treaties, 
something not entirely expected given the belief that a country’s treaty participation 
discourages its inbound FDI. In addition, rich countries with greater market potential 
participate in fewer treaties whereas poor countries with greater market potential participate 
in more treaties. This suggests a link between trade and treaty participation that potentially 
indicates a need to coordinate international trade agr ements with international 
environmental agreements.  
Finally, we find that treaty participation by rich ountries tends to increase treaty 
participation by other rich countries and by poor cuntries.  Poor countries’ treaty 
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participation, on the other hand, tends to draw little f any response. This suggests that efforts 
to expand international environmental agreements may require participation of the rich 
countries in order to be effective on a worldwide scale. Thus, in an era when developing 
nations such as India and China are rapidly becoming the world’s largest polluters, it may fall 
to the wealthy western nations to take the lead. Given the recent withdrawal of the US from 
the Kyoto agreement, our findings indicate a potentially bleak future for environmental 
agreements. Nevertheless, our hope is that these results prove useful in the developing policy 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All Treaties 14.690 6.557 0 31 
Sea Treaties 4.918 2.645 0 11 
Fish Treaties 2.392 1.584 0 7 
Air Treaties 1.506 1.057 0 3 
Ln(FDI flow) 9.037 0.608 7.849 12.581 
Ln(Market Potential) 8.098 1.315 4.441 10.604 
Ln(GDP) 19.258 1.228 16.509 22.943 
Ln(Population) 10.102 1.230 7.789 14.039 
Ln(Area) 12.834 1.930 6.471 16.653 
Urbanization 0.695 0.180 0.170 1.000 
Unemployment 0.074 0.041 0.005 0.239 
Freedom Index 9.655 2.846 0 12 
Corruption 3.979 2.511 0 9 
EU dummy 0.269 0.444 0 1 
Landlocked 0.071 0.257 0 1 
Export Diversification 0.473 0.158 0.125 0.774 
Included countries (41): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
USA, United Kingdom, Venezuela. 
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Table 2 Full Sample Results for All Treaties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No Spatial Lag,  No Spatial Lag,  Spatial Lag, Spatial Lag, 
 Exogenous FDI Endogenous FDI Exogenous FDI Endogenous FDI 
Spatial Lag   0.630*** 0.755*** 
   (0.073) (0.068) 
Ln(FDI) 0.341 -6.874*** 0.207 -0.792* 
 (0.317) (1.608) (0.299) (0.478) 
Ln(Market Potential) 0.920*** 0.518** -0.435* -0.758*** 
 (0.174) (0.252) (0.226) (0.224) 
Ln(GDP) 3.183*** 3.064*** 2.559*** 2.419*** 
 (0.571) (0.779) (0.542) (0.552) 
Ln(Population) -2.570*** -1.455* -1.615*** -1.276** 
 (0.555) (0.794) (0.534) (0.546) 
Ln(Area) 0.800*** 1.200*** 0.351*** 0.316** 
 (0.116) (0.180) (0.121) (0.123) 
Urbanization -1.525 -0.101 -1.704* -1.547 
 (1.009) (1.409) (0.950) (0.971) 
Unemployment 7.959** 9.710* 7.635** 7.807** 
 (4.013) (5.487) (3.778) (3.853) 
Freedom Index 0.357*** 0.095 0.154** 0.079 
 (0.079) (0.122) (0.078) (0.081) 
Corruption -0.192 -0.844*** -0.299*** -0.408*** 
 (0.122) (0.218) (0.116) (0.122) 
EU dummy 3.642*** 4.441*** 2.625*** 2.530*** 
 (0.450) (0.637) (0.439) (0.447) 
Landlocked -0.956 -0.824 -0.153 0.024 
 (0.630) (0.860) (0.600) (0.611) 
Export Diversification -4.309** 6.786* -2.319 -0.430 
 (1.979) (3.601) (1.877) (1.996) 
Constant -45.496*** 6.978 -31.243*** -21.347*** 
 (5.919) (13.862) (5.810) (6.492) 
Observations 635 635 635 635 
R-squared 0.78 0.58 0.80 0.79 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All specifications also include year-specific dummy variables. 
 
 39 
Table 3 Full Sample Results for Different Treaties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All (37) Sea (12) Fish (10) Air (3) 
Spatial Lag 0.755*** 1.031*** 0.564*** 0.783*** 
 (0.068) (0.120) (0.080) (0.064) 
Ln(FDI) -0.792* -0.483 0.194 0.132*** 
 (0.478) (0.306) (0.164) (0.047) 
Ln(Market Potential) -0.758*** -0.810*** -0.219*** 0.038* 
 (0.224) (0.146) (0.063) (0.022) 
Ln(GDP) 2.419*** 1.304*** 0.701*** 0.214*** 
 (0.552) (0.351) (0.188) (0.054) 
Ln(Population) -1.276** -0.579* -0.566*** -0.292*** 
 (0.546) (0.348) (0.183) (0.054) 
Ln(Area) 0.316** -0.111 0.141*** 0.050*** 
 (0.123) (0.081) (0.039) (0.012) 
Urbanization -1.547 -1.264** -0.175 -0.661*** 
 (0.971) (0.634) (0.334) (0.098) 
Unemployment 7.807** 1.537 3.145** 0.700* 
 (3.853) (2.470) (1.323) (0.376) 
Freedom Index 0.079 -0.053 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.081) (0.052) (0.028) (0.008) 
Corruption -0.408*** -0.173** -0.031 0.005 
 (0.122) (0.080) (0.042) (0.012) 
EU dummy 2.530*** 1.408*** 0.688*** 0.021 
 (0.447) (0.286) (0.151) (0.042) 
Landlocked 0.024 0.455 -0.541** 0.087 
 (0.611) (0.394) (0.212) (0.058) 
Export Diversification -0.430 -0.187 0.679 0.266 
 (1.996) (1.267) (0.683) (0.191) 
Constant -21.347*** -5.874 -9.045*** -2.942*** 
 (6.492) (4.032) (2.176) (0.683) 
Observations 635 635 635 635 
R-squared 0.79 0.48 0.59 0.93 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 4 OECD and Non-OECD Results for Different Treaties 
  OECD     Non-OECD  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All (37) Sea (12) Fish (10) Air (3)  All (37) Sea (12) Fish (10) Air (3) 
Spatial Lag 0.609*** 0.474*** 0.293*** 0.759***  0.136 -0.174 0.034 0.267 
 (0.138) (0.154) (0.100) (0.134)  (0.118) (0.136) (0.143) (0.165) 
Ln(FDI) 0.365 -0.366 0.711*** 0.196***  1.914** 1.269** 0.708*** 0.409*** 
 (0.380) (0.235) (0.167) (0.046)  (0.837) (0.547) (0.271) (0.125) 
Ln(Market Potential) -1.545*** -1.073*** -0.795*** 0.152***  1.700*** 0.369** 0.126 0.180*** 
 (0.185) (0.111) (0.082) (0.023)  (0.276) (0.181) (0.099) (0.041) 
Ln(GDP) 4.411*** 2.593*** 0.529* 0.180**  1.426 -0.09 1.838*** -0.227* 
 (0.717) (0.435) (0.319) (0.084)  (0.891) (0.573) (0.290) (0.132) 
Ln(Population) -5.236*** -3.120*** -0.834** -0.310***  -1.591** 0.008 -1.291*** -0.046 
 (0.772) (0.477) (0.344) (0.090)  (0.682) (0.428) (0.230) (0.101) 
Ln(Area) -1.017*** -0.581*** -0.378*** 0.034**  1.362*** 0.369*** 0.117* 0.123*** 
 (0.140) (0.087) (0.061) (0.017)  (0.199) (0.130) (0.063) (0.029) 
Urbanization -3.963*** -3.137*** -3.144*** -1.017**  3.205** 2.524** 0.843* 0.095 
 (1.384) (0.880) (0.613) (0.164)  (1.616) (0.982) (0.510) (0.217) 
Unemployment 12.451*** -6.109*** 9.900*** 0.273  12.732** 19.175*** 0.974 -0.196 
 (3.867) (2.347) (1.710) (0.451)  (6.001) (3.850) (1.998) (0.921) 
Freedom Index 0.295* 0.082 -0.187*** 0.057***  -0.23 ** -0.122** -0.035 0.010 
 (0.161) (0.101) (0.072) (0.019)  (0.090) (0.058) (0.028) (0.012) 
Corruption -0.125 0.120 -0.446*** 0.033**  0.020 0.051 0.240*** 0.053** 
 (0.140) (0.084) (0.061) (0.016)  (0.164) (0.099) (0.053) (0.024) 
EU dummy -1.313*** 0.012 -0.389** -0.099**      
 (0.411) (0.247) (0.180) (0.048)      
Landlocked -4.908*** -2.654*** -1.321*** -0.184***  2.882** 2.054** -0.694 0.289 
 (0.554) (0.321) (0.239) (0.060)  (1.429) (0.882) (0.457) (0.238) 
Export Diversification 26.463*** 14.329*** 9.056*** 0.773***  -9.123*** -2.817 -3.429*** 0.969** 
 (2.473) (1.505) (1.093) (0.289)  (2.972) (1.908) (0.970) (0.443) 
Constant -19.860*** -2.819 4.780 -4.097***  -49.417*** -17.723*** -28.618*** -2.401* 
 (7.359) (4.569) (2.979) (0.790)  (9.580) (6.211) (3.129) (1.436) 
Observations 373 373 373 373  262 262 262 262 
R-squared 0.83 0.67 0.63 0.94  0.84 0.64 0.64 0.88 




Table 5 OECD and Non-OECD Results with Different Strategic Interaction Responses 
  OECD    Non-OECD  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All (37) Sea (12) Fish (10) Air (3)  All (37) Sea (12) Fish (10) Air (3) 
Spatial Lag 0.500*** 0.530*** 0.247** 0.759***  0.194* -0.039 0.263* 0.072 
 (0.151) (0.165) (0.098) (0.134)  (0.111) (0.130) (0.137) (0.128) 
Non-OECD Spatial Lag -0.150 0.145 -1.408*** 0.026      
 (0.114) (0.177) (0.437) (0.053)      
OECD Spatial Lag      0.826*** 1.579*** 2.047*** 1.433*** 
      (0.159) (0.305) (0.343) (0.153) 
Ln(FDI) 0.176 -0.216 0.520*** 0.202***  1.117 0.790 0.113 0.179* 
 (0.433) (0.279) (0.170) (0.051)  (0.768) (0.508) (0.257) (0.097) 
Ln(Market Potential) -1.559*** -1.059*** -0.857*** 0.153***  1.046*** -0.079 -0.057 0.032 
 (0.184) (0.112) (0.082) (0.023)  (0.285) (0.189) (0.094) (0.035) 
Ln(GDP) 4.144*** 2.672*** 0.330 0.184**  1.597* 0.107 2.010*** -0.190* 
 (0.742) (0.446) (0.319) (0.084)  (0.842) (0.548) (0.268) (0.105) 
Ln(Population) -5.000*** -3.195*** -0.523 -0.314***  -2.091*** -0.271 -1.646*** -0.100 
 (0.793) (0.485) (0.350) (0.091)  (0.651) (0.413) (0.220) (0.080) 
Ln(Area) -0.963*** -0.602*** -0.320*** 0.031*  1.226*** 0.262** 0.093 0.083*** 
 (0.149) (0.090) (0.062) (0.018)  (0.190) (0.125) (0.058) (0.024) 
Urbanization -4.235*** -3.159*** -3.237*** -1.022**  2.691* 2.111** 0.434 0.058 
 (1.394) (0.881) (0.601) (0.164)  (1.527) (0.941) (0.474) (0.174) 
Unemployment 11.531*** -6.090** 8.537*** 0.307  8.234 16.084*** 0.552 -0.769 
 (3.907) (2.355) (1.728) (0.458)  (5.741) (3.733) (1.838) (0.737) 
Freedom Index 0.291* 0.082 -0.140* 0.058***  -0.270*** -0.158*** -0.070*** 0.009 
 (0.160) (0.101) (0.072) (0.019)  (0.085) (0.055) (0.026) (0.010) 
Corruption -0.133 0.121 -0.454*** 0.032*  0.163 0.125 0.311*** 0.066*** 
 (0.139) (0.084) (0.060) (0.016)  (0.157) (0.096) (0.051) (0.019) 
EU dummy -1.160*** -0.020 -0.350** -0.103**      
 (0.426) (0.250) (0.176) (0.049)      
Landlocked -4.775*** -2.713*** -1.196*** -0.195***  -0.252 0.184 -1.711*** -0.349* 
 (0.563) (0.329) (0.238) (0.065)  (1.486) (0.921) (0.458) (0.202) 
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  OECD    Non-OECD  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All (37) Sea (12) Fish (10) Air (3)  All (37) Sea (12) Fish (10) Air (3) 
Export Diversification 26.567*** 14.141*** 9.010*** 0.765***  -8.540*** -2.564 -2.842*** 1.050*** 
 (2.465) (1.514) (1.066) (0.292)  (2.808) (1.825) (0.896) (0.353) 
Constant -14.242* -5.015 6.863** -4.163***  -35.301***  -8.897 -21.850*** 0.888 
 (8.527) (5.198) (2.982) (0.816)  (9.212) (6.031) (3.013) (1.159) 
Observations 373 373 373 373  262 262 262 262 
R-squared 0.84 0.67 0.65 0.94  0.86 0.68 0.70 0.93 







Appendix A—Included Treaties 
 Treaty  Type 
Year of 
Signature Parties 
1 Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission 
Fish 1993 15 
2 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision f the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relting to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
Fish 1995 23 
3 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels 
on the High Seas 
Fish 1993 10 
4 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals  1972 16 
5 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer Air 1985 172 
6 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Fish 193 26 
7 Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets 
and the Size Limits of Fish 
Fish 1946 14 
8 Convention on Biological Diversity  1992 176 
9 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas 
Fish 1958 37 
10 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora 
 1973 148 
11 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Air 1979 44 
12 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
 1971 116 
13 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources 
Fish 1980 29 
14 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals 
 1979 60 
15 Convention on the Continental Shelf  1958 57 
16 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
 1989 132 
17 Convention on the High Seas Sea 1958 62 
18 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
Sea 1972 77 
19 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 
 1976 66 
20 Convention placing the International Poplar Commission 
within the Framework of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 
 1959 36 
21 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlan ic 
Tunas 
Fish 1966 24 
22 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships ( MARPOL ) 
Sea 1973 25 
23 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships ( MARPOL ) - Annex III: Hazardous substances arried 
in packaged form 
Sea 1978 89 
24 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Sea 1978 73 
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 Treaty  Type 
Year of 
Signature Parties 
Ships ( MARPOL ) - Annex IV: Sewage 
25 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships ( MARPOL ) - Annex V: Garbage 
Sea 1973 91 
26 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil 1962 and 1969 
Sea 1954 24 
27 International Convention for the Protection of Birds  1950 10 
28 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Fish 1946 38 
29 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 
Sea 1969 69 
30 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparednss 
Response and Co-operation 
Sea 1990 41 
31 International Convention on Salvage Sea 1989 26 
32 International Convention relating to Intervention on the High 
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 
Sea 1969 72 
33 International Convention to Combat Desertification in those 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or 
Desertification 
 1994 157 
34 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 
 1997 9 
35 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Fish&Sea 1982 130 
36 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Air 1992 180 





Appendix B—Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
Treaty participation Number of treaties to which a country is a party CIESIN 
Ln(FDI) Log of [FDI flow –minimum FDI flow + 1 ], where FDI flow is  in constant $millions.28 UNCTAD (FDI Database) 
Ln(GDP) Log of GDP ($, constant) Heston et al., 2002 (PWT 6.1) 
Ln(Population) Log of population (in 1,000s) Heston et al., 2002 (PWT 6.1) 
Ln(Area) Log of area World Bank (WDI 2004) 
Urbanization Urban population (% of total) World Bank (WDI 2004) 
Unemployment Unemployment (% of total labor force) World Bank (WDI 2004) 
Freedom Index 14-(CL+PR), where CL is the civil liberties index and PR is the political rights index. 
CL and PR vary between 1 and 7 and higher numbers indicate lower freedom. 
Freedom House 
Corruption 1-CPI, where CPI is the corruption perceptions index, which decreasing in corruption. Transparency International 
EU dummy European Union dummy Generated by authors 
Landlocked Landlocked country dummy CEPII 
Export Diversification 1-DI, where DI is the export diversification index with higher numbers indicating 
narrower export base. 
UNCTAD (Handbook of 
Statistics) 
Ln(Market Potential) Distance weighted average of other countries' GDP, matrix of weights is the non-rw-
standardized version of the one used in construction of the spatial lag. 
GDP from Heston et al., 2002, 
distances from CEPII 
Instruments for FDI:   
Ln(Trade Costs) 








Heston et al., 2002 (PWT 6.1) 
Ln(Education) Log of average years of schooling for th se over age 25. (Data every five years, with 
linear interpolation by authors for in-between years.) 
Barro and Lee (1996) 
Ln(Investment Costs) Log of measure of business enviro ment risk. Composite measure of operations risk 
index, political risk index and remittance and repatriation factor index. 
Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence S.A. 
 
                                                
28 The FDI flow is negative for some observations, thus to avoid dropping these in the log specification we scale up the variable. 
